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We extend Akerlof (1970)’s “Market for Lemons” by assuming that some buy-
ers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the
quality of the good that is on display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not up-
date according to Bayes’ rule but take the noisy signal at face value. We show
that the presence of overconfident buyers can stabilize the market outcome by
preventing total adverse selection. This stabilization, however, comes at a
cost: rational buyers are crowded out of the market.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There are many markets for used goods that seem to work quite well. In particular nowa-
days in the age of the Internet, there exist many platforms where tremendous amounts of
used goods of all kinds are traded, most prominently eBay. For instance, the trade volume
of eBay Motors in the United States is approximately 36000 cars sold each month (Lewis,
2011). Markets for used goods, in particular used cars where stakes are relatively high,
having a high volume of trade is puzzling from the perspective of standard economics. It
seems reasonable to presume that the potential seller of a used commodity, say a used car,
has a good idea of the quality of her car, whereas the potential buyer obtains only little
information whether the car on display is a “lemon” or a “cream puff”. Given this infor-
mation structure, standard models of adverse selection predict that only low-quality goods
are traded in equilibrium and that the volume of trade is low (Akerlof, 1970). In the ex-
treme, the asymmetric information problem can lead to a complete market breakdown. A
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seller who owns a cream puff prefers not to offer her car on the market, which reduces the
average quality in the market and in turn the trade volume. Besides casual observations
that markets for used goods function well, also empirical works investigating markets for
used cars find only weak evidence for adverse selection (Bond, 1982; Genesove, 1993).
We provide one possible explanation for this puzzling gap between theoretical predic-
tions and empirical observations by positing that buyers might be overconfident in the
following sense: an overconfident buyer believes that he can judge the quality of the good
by inspecting it, when in fact he only receives a noisy signal about the good’s true quality.
For instance, the buyer might consider himself as an expert for used cars and thus believes
that after a test drive he knows whether the car is a lemon or a cream puff. A short test
drive, however, not necessarily reveals whether the car was involved in an accident and
cosmetically repaired afterward, so a test drive is a noisy signal at best. We show that if
the buyer is overconfident with positive probability, there always exists an equilibrium in
which high-quality goods are traded. Moreover, if it is sufficiently likely that the buyer is
overconfident, all pure-strategy equilibria are pooling equilibria in which all qualities are
traded. The presence of overconfident buyers thus can stabilize the market and helps to
prevent the total adverse selection outcome. This market stabilization, however, comes at
a cost: rational buyers do not participate in the market anymore. Furthermore, the pres-
ence of overconfident buyers can create incentives for sellers to invest in inefficient signal
obfuscation—i.e., making the true quality even more shrouded.
We introduce buyer overconfidence in an otherwise standard and fairly simple model
of a market with asymmetric information. There is a single seller and a single buyer.
The seller, who owns one unit of the good, knows whether her item is of high quality
or low quality. The buyer, on the other hand, cannot directly observe the quality of the
good but receives a private noisy signal about the quality of the item on display. We
focus on highly uninformative signals, so that in the benchmark case where the buyer
is a rational Bayesian updater the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome in pure
strategies is total adverse selection: only items of low quality are traded in equilibrium.
This benchmark outcome is in contrast to the findings we obtain when the buyer might
be overconfident, because then high-quality items are always traded in equilibrium with
positive probability.
Related Literature.—Beginning with Akerlof’s (1970) seminal contribution, by now
there exists a large literature investigating markets with asymmetric information. Ana-
lyzing a market with perfectly informed sellers and uninformed buyers, Akerlof (1970)
shows that asymmetric information leads to a reduction in the average quality sold in the
market and also reduces the trade volume. In the extreme, asymmetric information can
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lead to a market unraveling, i.e., no transaction takes place in equilibrium. Wilson (1980)
extends this analysis by demonstrating that equilibrium outcomes crucially depend on
the price-setting mechanism. Later contributions focus on how the degree of asymmet-
ric information affects the market outcome. Investigating a market where sellers are not
perfectly informed, both Kessler (2001) and Levin (2001) find that market performance
behaves non-monotonically in the degree of asymmetric of information. A setting with a
monopolistic seller where buyers can purchase information about the quality of the good
at display is analyzed by Bester and Ritzberger (2001). They find that as the cost of infor-
mation becomes small, the unique equilibrium approaches the full information outcome
and prices become perfectly revealing. Recent contributions consider the situation where
the buyer receives a private signal about the offered quality. Investigating how the signal
precision affects the equilibrium outcome, Voorneveld and Weibull (2011) demonstrate
that the equilibrium is discontinuous at the boundaries of completely uninformative and
completely informative signals. Focusing on the case where it is inefficient to trade goods
of poor quality, Adriani and Deidda (2009) show that the unique equilibrium surviving
D1 (Cho and Kreps, 1987) is characterized by market breakdown. Finally, Adriani and
Deidda (2011) show that strong competition between sellers inhibits the role of prices as
signals and drives high-quality sellers out of the market.
A model of asymmetric information with a non-rational buyer is discussed by Eyster
and Rabin (2005). The authors develop an equilibrium concept, called cursed equilibrium,
where “cursed” players do not take fully into account how other players’ actions depend
on their private information. Eyster and Rabin show that in a “lemons market” cursedness
on the side of the buyer has two opposing effects on the probability with which trade
takes place. On the one hand, a cursed buyer expects the good to be of higher quality,
because he does not understand that the seller is willing to sell only when her value is low.
On the other hand, a cursed buyer does not understand that a higher price increases the
expected quality. Whether cursedness leads to more or less trade compared to the rational
benchmark depends on the possible gains from trade. If gains from trade are high, the
second effect outweighs the first effect and cursedness reduces the probability of trade.
In contrast to Eyster and Rabin (2005) we posit that the buyer is overconfident instead of
cursed. Moreover, we allow for buyer heterogeneity—in the sense that the buyer can be
overconfident or rational—and investigate how the presence of biased buyers affects the
well-being of rational buyers.
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a paper that incorporates overconfi-
dent buyers into a commodity market with asymmetric information. Sandroni and Squin-
tani (2007) introduce overconfident agents into Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)’s classic
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insurance market. Overconfident agents here believe that their risk is low when indeed
it is high. While a compulsory insurance can lead to a Pareto improvement when all
insurees are rational, this is no longer the case when a sufficiently large proportion of
the insurees is overconfident. Considering a model where consumers are uncertain about
their future demand when signing a contract, Grubb (2009) shows that the optimal con-
tract closely resembles a three-part tariff if consumers are overconfident in the sense that
they underestimate variations in their future tastes. Next to Industrial Organization, over-
confident agents are also introduced to operations management (Crowson, Crowson, and
Ren, 2007) and contract theory (Fang and Moscarini, 2005; de la Rosa, 2011).
2. THE MODEL
A seller (S) owns one unit of an indivisible good, the quality of which is q ∈ {qL, qH}
with 0 ≤ qL < qH .1 Her reservation price for quality q is r(q), with r(qL) = rL and
r(qH) = rH . The probability of S being endowed with high quality is α ∈ (0, 1). The
buyer (B)’s valuation for quality q, v(q), is normalized such that v(qL) = qL and v(qH) =
qH .
Assumption 1.
(i) qH − rH ≥ qL − rL
(ii) qL − rL > 0
(iii) rH > q¯ := αqH + (1− α)qL
Assumption 1 (i) and (ii) together guarantee that there are positive gains from trade
for all quality levels, an assumption usually imposed in the literature.2 Moreover, we are
interested in markets in which there is an adverse selection problem in the sense that high-
quality sellers value the item above the average quality, Assumption 1 (iii). If Assumption
1 (iii) is violated there does always exist a pooling equilibrium. It is important to note that
Assumption 1 (iii) implies that B’s willingness to pay for a low-quality item is below the
reservation price of a high-quality seller, qL < rH .
WhileB cannot directly observe quality, he receives a private signal s ∈ {L,H}, which
is positively correlated with true quality, γ = Pr(s = H|q = qH) = Pr(s = L|q = qL) ∈
(1/2, 1). We refer to s = H and s = L as the “good” and the “bad” signal, respectively.
There are two potential types of buyers, τ ∈ {R,O}: with probability 1 − λ, B is a
rational Bayesian updater (τ = R), who draws the correct informational inference from
1Modeling the lemons market as a bilateral monopoly is not uncommon in the literature and used, for
instance, by Ellingsen (1997). In the benchmark case with a Bayesian buyer, our model is a simplified
version of Voorneveld and Weibull (2011) with binary signals.
2Assumption 1 (i) is made in order to simplify the exposition.
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the signal he receives. With probability λ ∈ [0, 1), B is overconfident (τ = O) in his own
ability to judge the quality of the item from his private signal in the sense that he believes
the signal to be perfectly informative.
Two prominent notions of overconfidence are overprecision and overestimation. While
overprecision refers to people believing their estimates to be more accurate than they
actually are, overestimation alludes to people overestimating their own abilities.3 Our
model captures both these biases: if the buyer wrongly believes his noisy signal to be
perfectly accurate, then he is prone to overestimation; if he wrongly believes to be an
expert who can perfectly determine the quality of the item on display by inspecting it,
then he suffers from overestimation.
Both S and B are risk neutral and maximize expected profit and expected utility, re-
spectively. While S’s profit from selling at price p is pi = p−r,B’s utility from purchasing
quality q at price p is u = q− p. If no trade takes place, S’s profit and B’s utility are zero.
The sequence of events is as follows. (i) Nature draws q ∈ {qL, qH}. (ii) S observes
q and sets a take-it-or-leave-it price p ∈ R. A pure strategy for S is a pair (pL, pH),
where pL (pH) denotes the price for a low-quality (high-quality) item. (iii) Nature draws
τ ∈ {R,O} and s ∈ {L,H}. (iv) The buyer sees the price p set by the seller and
privately observes the signal s. Based on this information, B decides whether to buy the
item. A pure strategy for a buyer of type τ is a function bτ : R × {L,H} −→ {0, 1},
where bτ (p, s) = 1 means “buy” and bτ (p, s) = 0 means “don’t buy” at price p and
for signal s. (v) Both parties receive their respective payoffs, pi = (p − r)bτ (p, s) and
u = (q − p)bτ (p, s).4
We augment the usual notion of (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies
in order to allow for an overconfident buyer.5 Let µτs(p) denote the belief held by buyer
type τ about high quality being offered when observing price p and receiving signal s.
Let µτ = {(µτL(p), µτH(p)) ∈ [0, 1]2|p ∈ R}.
Definition 1. A market equilibrium is a vector (µR, µO, (pL, pH), bR(p, s),
bO(p, s)) that satisfies the following conditions:
(B1) If pL 6= pH , then µRL(pL) = µRH(pL) = 0 and µRL(pH) = µRH(pH) = 1.
(B2) If pL = pH = p¯, then
µRH(p¯) =
γα
γα + (1− γ)(1− α) and µ
R
L(p¯) =
(1− γ)α
(1− γ)α + γ(1− α) .
3See Alpert and Raiffa (1982) or Soll and Klayman (2004) on overprecision, and Clayson (2005) or
Buehler, Griffin, and Ross (1994) on overestimation.
4The analysis would remain unchanged if all draws by nature occurred in step (i).
5Focusing on pure-strategy equilibria often allows us to obtain a unique equilibrium outcome without
applying any equilibrium refinement.
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(B3) For all p ∈ R and s ∈ {L,H}, µOL (p) = 0 and µOH(p) = 1.
(SR) At each information set, the concerned player’s strategy is a best response to the
other player’s strategy under the belief induced by µ at that information set.
(B1) and (B2) specify a rational buyer’s beliefs on the equilibrium path: if S charges
different prices for different qualities, an incompletely informed rational buyer should—
irrespective of the signal he receives—believe the item to be of low quality if he observes
price pL and of high quality if he observes price pH ; if S charges the same price for
both high-quality and low-quality items, then a rational buyer’s beliefs are determined
by Bayes’ rule. (B3) specifies that an overconfident buyer takes the signal at face value
irrespective of the price. Last, (SR) requires sequential rationality.
Finally, let ρL and ρH denote the trading probabilities in equilibrium for low-quality
and high-quality goods, respectively.
3. THE ANALYSIS
The following observations hold irrespective of B’s type: first, sequential rationality re-
quires bτ (p, s) = 1 for p ≤ qL and bτ (p, s) = 0 for p > qH . Thus, in any equilibrium
low quality must be traded with strictly positive probability at a price of at least qL and
at most qH—otherwise S could profitably deviate to p = qL. Likewise, high quality
will never be priced strictly below rH because S could profitably deviate to p > qH .
Hence, there are three kinds of equilibrium candidates: (i) pooling equilibrium, i.e.,
pL = pH = p¯ ∈ [rH , qH ], (ii) separating equilibrium with trade of high-quality items,
i.e., pL = qL and pH ∈ [rH , qH ] and (iii) separating equilibrium without trade of high-
quality items (total adverse selection), i.e., pL = qL and pH ≥ qH .6
3.1. No Overconfidence and Total Adverse Selection
In this subsection we analyze, as a benchmark, the case where the buyer is a rational
Bayesian updater with certainty, i.e. λ = 0. If the signal is sufficiently imprecise, then
no pooling equilibrium exists. Intuitively, with q¯ < rH , B purchases at the pooling price
p¯ ≥ rH only if he receives positive information about the quality on display, i.e., s = H .
If the signal is highly uninformative, however, then B’s willingness to pay after receiving
s = H is below rH and thus no pooling equilibrium exists.
6If the buyer is overconfident with positive probability, there may exist another type of separating equi-
librium with trade of high-quality items. A low-quality seller sells at a higher price than a high-quality
seller. While the low-quality seller sells only to an overconfident buyer who received a good signal,
the high-quality seller sells also to a rational buyer. The proof of Proposition 2 shows that such an
equilibrium does not exist.
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Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For λ = 0 there does not exist a pure-
strategy pooling equilibrium if
γ < γ˜ :=
(rH − qL)(1− α)
(qH − rH)α + (rH − qL)(1− α) ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
. (1)
Moreover, for a sufficiently imprecise signal there does not exist a separating equilib-
rium with trade of high-quality items. Intuitively, a pure-strategy separating equilibrium is
most likely to exist ifB purchases the high-quality item only after receiving s = H , which
requires that pH = qH . Even if B follows this strategy, however, a low-quality seller can
profitably mimic a high-quality seller if B receiving a good signal is sufficiently likely to
occur also in the case of low quality.
Lemma 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. For λ = 0 there does not exist a pure-
strategy separating equilibrium with ρH > 0 if
γ < γˆ :=
qH − qL
qH − rL ∈
(
1
2
, 1
)
. (2)
In what follows, we restrict attention to a rather noisy signal such that in the benchmark
case high quality is not traded in equilibrium.
Assumption 2. γ < min{γˆ, γ˜}.
We can always support a separating equilibrium without trade of high quality—this is
most obvious for pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs, i.e., µRs (p) = 0 for all p 6= pH
and s ∈ {L,H}. Thus, for a fairly noisy signal, the market exhibits the well-known
adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970).
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. For λ = 0, in all pure-strategy
equilibria it holds that pL = qL, pH ≥ qH , ρL = 1 and ρH = 0.
3.2. Overconfidence and Market Stabilization
Now, we posit that the buyer is overconfident with probability λ ∈ (0, 1). The first
observation is that total adverse selection is not a feasible equilibrium outcome if there
are overconfident buyers in the market. A seller of high quality can always ask for a price
higher than her reservation value—pH ∈ (rH , qH ]—that allows her to sell with positive
probability because she sells at least to an overconfident buyer who receives a good signal.
Even if there are only few overconfident buyers and even if the signal is fairly noisy, this
strategy leads to strictly positive profits in expectations. Thus, if there exists a pure-
strategy equilibrium, then both qualities are traded in this equilibrium. In the following,
we characterize this equilibrium and establish conditions for its existence.
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First, we show the existence of a pooling equilibrium in which high-quality items are
traded with strictly positive probability even when the signal is very uninformative, i.e.,
Assumption 2 holds. In any pooling equilibrium with trade of high quality we must
have p¯ ∈ [rH , qH ]. Upon observing price p¯, beliefs of a rationally updating buyer are
determined according to (B2), whereas beliefs of an overconfident buyer are given by
(B3). In consequence, upon observing price p¯ and signal s ∈ {H,L}, a rational buyer
purchases the item if
p¯ ≤ q¯(s) ≡ µs(p¯)qH + [1− µs(p¯)]qL. (3)
Thus, for γ < γ˜, a rational buyers does not purchase at price p¯ because q¯(L) < q¯(H) <
rH . An overconfident buyer, on the other hand, purchases if p¯ ≤ qs, and therefore buys
the item at price p¯ if he receives s = H . Hence, irrespective of her item’s quality, for
any price p¯ ∈ [rH , qH) the seller has an incentive to deviate to the highest price at which
trade possibly takes place, such that the only price consistent with a pooling equilibrium
is p¯ = qH . To establish existence of a pooling equilibrium with price p¯ = qH , consider
pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs for a rational buyer, i.e., µs(p) = 0 for all p 6= p¯
and s ∈ {L,H}. Since the seller of a low-quality item can always sell for sure at a price
qL, p¯ = qH can only be part of a pooling equilibrium if qL − rL ≤ λ(1− γ)(qH − rL), or
equivalently, if
λ ≥ qL − rL
(1− γ)(qH − rL) =: λ¯. (4)
Note that γ < γˆ implies λ¯ < 1. Since a high-quality seller obviously has no reason to
deviate, there exists a pooling equilibrium even for a fairly noisy signal as long as the
share of overconfident buyers is sufficiently large.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, for λ ∈ (0, 1) there does
not exist a pure-strategy separating equilibrium. If λ ≥ λ¯, then there exists a pure-strategy
pooling equilibrium with a price pL = pH = qH and trading probabilities ρL = λ(1− γ)
and ρH = λγ.
From the above proposition, the next result—for the case with almost no gains from
trade for low-quality items—follows immediately.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that qL → rL. Then, for λ ∈
(0, 1) there always exists a pure-strategy equilibrium and any pure-strategy equilibrium
is a pooling equilibrium.
According to Corollary 1, if the low-quality item is basically useless, then an arbitrary
small proportion of overconfident buyers in the market is sufficient to avoid the undesir-
able total adverse selection outcome.
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3.3. Market Efficiency
So far we have shown that the presence of overconfident buyers can help to avoid the total
adverse selection outcome. It thus stands to reason that the presence of overconfident buy-
ers can also improve market efficiency. Given the buyer is overconfident with probability
λ, then market efficiency, defined as expected gains from trade, is
W (λ) = αρH(λ)(qH − rH) + (1− α)ρL(λ)(qL − rL). (5)
Comparison of W (0) and W (λ) (with λ ≥ λ¯) reveals that the presence of overconfident
buyers in the market tends to increase market efficiency if (i) there are many sellers with a
high-quality good who otherwise would not offer their goods on the market, (ii) there are
many overconfident buyers willing to buy the good in case of a good signal, and (iii) gains
from trade are much higher for a high-quality than for a low-quality item. In particular, as
gains from trading low quality become small, qL → rL, then buyer overconfidence strictly
improves market efficiency.
3.4. Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
One question is immediately at hand from Proposition 2: What happens for λ < λ¯, i.e.,
if neither a pure-strategy pooling equilibrium nor a pure-strategy separating equilibrium
exists? In this case, there exists a mixed-strategy separating equilibrium with trade of
high-quality items. The equilibrium prices are pL = qL and pH = qH . With pessimistic
out-of-equilibrium beliefs for a rational buyer, in one type of equilibrium the buyer plays
the following mixed strategy: bR(pH , H) = σ ∈ (0, 1), bR(p, s) = 1 for p ≤ qL, and
bR(p, s) = 0 in the remaining cases. If the mixing probability σ is sufficiently small, then
the low-quality seller has no incentives to mimic the high-quality seller. For pessimistic
out-of-equilibrium beliefs the mixing probability has to satisfy
σ ≤ λ¯− λ
1− λ =: σ¯. (6)
As is intuitive, with a low-quality seller’s incentive to deviate being increasing in the
share of overconfident buyers, the maximum mixing probability decreases in λ. In this
equilibrium, rational buyers as well as overconfident buyers and both types of sellers
are active. In this mixed-strategy equilibrium, the maximum trading probability for high
quality is
ρ¯H(λ) = γ[λ+ (1− λ)σ¯] = γλ¯, (7)
and does not depend on λ. Thus, in this mixed-strategy equilibrium the presence of over-
confident buyers leaves market efficiency unaffected. Notice that this mixed strategy equi-
librium exists also in the benchmark case with λ = 0. In this equilibrium rational buyers
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are skeptical when observing a high price and therefore buy only once in a while—even
though they know that the good is of high quality on the equilibrium path. Moreover, the
rational buyer has to be sufficiently skeptical in order to stabilize this kind of equilibrium.
Therefore, we believe that as long as a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, this is the more
plausible prediction than the described mixed-strategy equilibrium.
3.5. Obfuscation
So far, we abstracted from the possibility that a seller might be able to influence the quality
of the signal the buyer receives. One can imagine, however, that the seller can invest into
obfuscating the quality of the car and this is unobservable to the buyer, i.e., by investing
the seller makes the signal noisier. For instance, the seller might clean and polish the car
in order to pretend that she always handled the car with due care. With polishing the car
only for sale being costly and unobservable, if all buyers are rational no seller should have
an incentive to display a car which looks well-kempt even though it is not to a potential
buyer. If some buyers are overconfident, on the other hand, then it might well be rational
for a seller to polish her car. In the following we briefly analyze the seller’s incentives to
invest in signal obfuscation and the resulting welfare effects.
Suppose the seller can—after observing her type—invest in signal obfuscation at cost
c > 0, i.e., the seller chooses I ∈ {0, 1}. The seller’s investment, which is not observed
by the buyer, affects the signal precision, γI for I ∈ {0, 1}. Let γ1 < γ0 < min{γ˜, γˆ}
and λ ≥ λ¯. Independent of the seller’s investment decision, the unique pure-strategy
equilibrium is the one described in Proposition 2: pH = pL = qH , ρL = λ(1 − γI)
and ρH = λγI . Obviously, a high-quality seller has no incentives to invest in signal
obfuscation because this reduces her trading probability and is costly. A low-quality
seller, on the other hand, may have an incentive to invest in quality obfuscation because it
increases her trading probability. The low-quality seller invests if and only if
c¯ := λ(qH − rL)(γ0 − γ1) ≥ c. (8)
The investment is undesirable from the buyer’s point of view but can be desirable from
a welfare point of view, since it increases the trading probability. Private benefits from
investment, however, diverge from social benefits of investment. From a welfare point of
view the investment is desirable if and only if
cˆ := λ(qL − rL)(γ0 − γ1) ≥ c. (9)
Note that cˆ < c¯, so there exists a range of investment costs where a low-quality seller
invests in signal obfuscation and this is undesirable from a welfare point of view. This
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range is particularly large if the gains from trading a low-quality item are negligible, i.e.,
for qL → rL we have cˆ → 0. Thus, in the case where without investment opportunities
the presence of overconfident buyers unambiguously improves market efficiency it leads
to undesirable investments in obfuscation if these investments are feasible. The positive
effect that buyer overconfidence has on the trading probability and thus welfare can be
outweighed by the negative effect it has on investments—the negative effect is likely to
be more important if the seller is likely to possess an item of low quality, i.e., if α is low.
In summary, how the presence of overconfident buyers affects market performance is not
clear in general, because there are several opposing effects.
4. CONCLUSION
We introduce overconfident buyers into an otherwise standard model of asymmetric in-
formation, where the seller is better informed about the quality of the good than the buyer.
Buyer overconfidence in our model can be interpreted as either overprecision or overes-
timation. We show that if the proportion of overconfident buyers is not too small, then
the unique equilibrium outcome is a pooling equilibrium with trade of both high-quality
and low-quality goods. If, on the other hand, all buyers are rational Bayesian updater,
then the unique equilibrium outcome is total adverse selection: only “lemons” are traded
on the market. The presence of overconfident buyers thus leads to also “cream puffs”
being traded, which is likely to increase market performance—in particular if gains from
trading lemons are small compared to gains from trading cream puffs.
One might wonder how robust the finding is that the presence of overconfident buyers
increases market performance. The presence of overconfident buyers can enhance mar-
ket performance not only by preventing total adverse selection. It can be shown that if
there exists a separating equilibrium with trade of high-quality items in pure strategies,
then the presence of overconfident buyers can increase market performance. Without
overconfident buyers, rational buyers purchase high-quality items only after observing a
good signal. If there are many overconfident buyers, then there also exists a separating
equilibrium where rational buyers always purchase a high-quality item.
Finally, we studied a fairly stylized model which abstracts from many issues that might
play a crucial role in practice. Arguably the strongest simplification is that an overconfi-
dent buyer takes the signal at face value. From this assumption it follows almost immedi-
ately that total adverse selection is no longer an equilibrium outcome. How the presence
of overconfident buyers affects the equilibrium outcome and Bayesian buyers is less clear,
however. The contribution of this paper is it to provide an answer to these questions. With
a less extreme form of overconfidence the analysis is more intricate and there are typically
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multiple pure-strategy equilibria. Suppose an overconfident buyer knows that the signal
is only a noisy measure of the good’s actual quality but wrongly believes that the signal
is more precise than it actually is, i.e., the overconfident buyer believes that γ is larger. In
such a model it is necessary to formulate out-of-equilibrium beliefs also for an overcon-
fident buyer. A direct implication of this is that there exists a set of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs so that the equilibrium outcome is total adverse selection. Our notion captures, in
an extreme way, the idea that biased agents trust more in the information they receive than
in the abstract believes they have formed about the behavior of other market participants.
A. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS AND LEMMAS
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose, in contradiction, that the price p¯ constitutes a pooling equi-
librium. We know that we must have p¯ ∈ [rH , qH ]. Given price p¯, a rational buyer’s belief
about the item being of high quality after receiving signal s ∈ {L,H} is given by µs(p¯)
according to (B2) and he will buy the item if and only if
p¯ ≤ µs(p¯)qH + (1− µs(p¯))qL =: q¯(s). (A.1)
Since q¯(L) < q¯ < rH , for a pooling equilibrium with trade of high-quality items to
exist, we must have p¯ ∈ [rH , q¯(H)]. Put differently, if a pooling equilibrium exists then
the buyer will purchase the item only after receiving the good signal s = H . Note that
limγ↘1/2 q¯(H) = q¯, limγ↗1 q¯(H) = qH , and dq¯(H)/dγ > 0. Hence, by the intermediate-
value theorem, there exists a unique value γ˜ such that q¯(H) = rH .
Finally, note that γ˜ > 1/2, or equivalently
(1− α)(rH − qL) > α(qH − rH), (A.2)
by Assumption 1 (iii), which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, according to (B1), in any separating equilibrium with equilib-
rium prices pL 6= pH we have µs(pL) = 0 and µs(pH) = 1 for s ∈ {L,H}. This
implies that pL = qL: if pL > qL, then the buyer would not buy and the seller of a low-
quality item could profitably deviate to a price p ∈ (rL, qL], thereby selling for sure; if
pL < qL, then the seller of a low-quality item could profitably deviate to p = qL, thereby
still selling for sure at a higher price. Next, whenever a high-quality seller sells with
strictly positive probability in equilibrium, i.e., ρH > 0, we must have pH ∈ [rH , qH ].
Note that, since µs(pH) = 1, sequential rationality requires that the buyer always buys for
pH ∈ [rH , qH). This, however cannot be part of any equilibrium because a low-quality
seller could profitably deviate to price pH . Therefore. in any separating equilibrium in
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which the seller of a high-quality item sells with strictly positive probability, we have
ρH < 1 and thus pH = qH (because B has to be indifferent between buying and not
buying at price pH). With our focus on pure strategies, for ρH < 1 to be feasible, the
buyer has to condition his purchasing decision at price pH on the realization of the signal
he receives, i.e., b(pH , s) = 1 for s ∈ B ⊂ {L,H} and b(pH , s) = 0 for s ∈ {L,H}\B.
With Pr(H|qL) < Pr(L|qL), the seller of a low-quality item will deviate to pH = qH if
Pr(H|qL)(qH − rL) > (qL − rL), or equivalently, if γ < γˆ. Noting that γˆ > 1/2 if and
only if qH − qL > qL − rL, which holds by Assumption 1, completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. We show that a separating equilibrium without trade of high-
quality items always exist. The proposition follows from this observation together with
Lemmas 1 and 2.
In an adverse selection equilibrium, we must have pL = qL, pH ≥ qH , and µs(pL) = 0
and µs(pH) = 1 for s ∈ {L,H}. With buyer behavior for prices p ≤ qL and p > qH not
depending on the buyer’s beliefs, in order to support the equilibrium under consideration,
we have to specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs for prices p ∈ (qL, qH ] such that neither type
of seller has an incentive to deviate. One set of beliefs doing the job is given by µs(p) ≤
(p−qL)/(qH−qL) for p ∈ (qL, qH ] and s ∈ {L,H}. Since µs(p)qH+(1−µs(p))qL−p ≤ 0
it is sequentially rational for the buyer never to buy at prices p ∈ (qL, qH ], which in turn
implies that no type of seller has an incentive to deviate to such prices.7
Proof of Proposition 2. Existence of a pooling equilibrium for λ ≥ λ¯ is established in the
main text. It remains to show that there does not exist a pure-strategy separating equi-
librium with trade of high-quality items. There are two potential kinds of pure-strategy
separating equilibria:
(i) The standard separating equilibrium with trade of high-quality items, where pL = qL
and pH ∈ [rH , qH ]. This kind of equilibrium is most likely to exist if the Bayesian buyer
has pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs and purchases at pH only after receiving s = H .
This strategy is sequentially rational only for pH = qH . Moreover, we know that pL = qL.
If the Bayesian buyer uses this strategy, then he behaves (on the equilibrium path) exactly
as an overconfident buyer. Thus, the incentives to deviate to p = qH for a seller who
possesses a good of low quality are independent of the probability with which she faces
an overconfident buyer. Hence, it follows immediately from Lemma 2 that a low-quality
seller prefers to deviate if γ < γˆ. Thus, there does not exist a pure-strategy separating
equilibrium if Assumption 2 holds.
7Here, it is assumed that the buyer does not purchase the high-quality item if he is indifferent. If we
assumed otherwise, i.e., the buyer purchases with strictly positive probability in the case of indifference,
then in all pure-strategy equilibria it holds that pH > qH . Also, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs specified
above for prices p ∈ (qL, qH ] have to be adjusted to µs(p) < (p− qL)/(qH − qL).
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(ii) For pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs there may exist a separating equilibrium
in which pL = qH and pH ∈ [rH , qH). Low-quality sellers sell only to overconfident
buyers who received signal s = H . High-quality sellers also trade (always) with Bayesian
buyers, since pH < qH and the price signals the quality.
In such an equilibrium, a low-quality seller cannot capitalize on mimicking a high-
quality seller if
λ(1− γ)(qH − rL) ≥ [1− λ+ λ(1− γ)](pH − rL)
⇐⇒ λ ≥ pH − rL
qH − rL − γ(qH − pH) ≡ λˆ1(γ). (A.3)
The lower bound, λˆ1(γ), is increasing in γ. A high-quality seller does not want to switch
to p = qH = pL if
λ(1− λ+ λγ)(pH − rH) ≥ λγ(qH − rH)
⇐⇒ λ ≤ pH − rH
pH − rH + γ(qH − pH) ≡ λˆ2(γ), (A.4)
with λˆ2(γ) being decreasing. The equilibrium exists only if λˆ1(γ) ≤ λ ≤ λˆ2(γ), which
is most likely to be satisfied if γ → 1/2. Thus, there does not exist a such a separating
equilibrium if χ(rL) > χ(rH) where
χ(x) ≡ 2(pH − x)
qH + pH − 2x.
Note that qH > pH implies that χ′(x) < 0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. The result follows from Proposition 2 and the fact that λ¯ → 0 if
qL → rL.
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